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The last 10 years have presented the Marine Corps with the 
challenge of continuous deployments to hostile environments 
at an unprecedented rate. This study examines the 
correlation between deployment tempo and medical separation 
rates for Marines who have shown an intention to remain in 
the Service by reenlisting past their first term. It does 
so by comparing the probability of medical separation for 
careerists relative to other causes of separation. The data 
comes from the Marine Corps Total Data Force Warehouse. 
Interaction effects were measured using a Linear 
Probability Model and probit estimations. 
Key variables in my study are gender, a 9/11 
partition, and the number of deployments. Medical 
separations are defined as acute sources, such as loss of 
limb, degenerative sources such as back pain and other 
long-term ailments, and medical retirements. 
Among those separated, I find that the increased 
deployment tempo in the post-9/11 era leads to decreases in 
medical separation rates, particularly among those with two 
or more deployments. There is also a notable additional 
decrease in medical separation for female Marines who have 
deployed.  
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Perceptions are easy to establish and maintain when 
there is no quantifiable data to prove them accurate or 
incorrect. The analysis of data to determine trends and 
isolate factors of significance can go a long way towards 
truly understanding the nature of our force. Sometimes this 
analysis will support these perceptions and assist in their 
definition, and sometimes it will force a re-assessment of 
them. By analyzing Marine Corps separation data, I provide 
trends and significant factors that will prove useful to 
decision-makers, manpower planners, and those engaged in 
national conversations concerning a variety of topics such 
as deployment effects, gender effects, and the impact of 
9/11/2001. 
The research is centered on the segment of the fleet 
known as careerists, or those who are generally choosing to 
stay beyond their initial term of service. The Marine Corps 
uses two main categories to define the retainment status of 
Marines, first-term and subsequent-term. The first-term 
reenlistment process is a powerful force-shaping tool, as 
the Marine Corps can increase or decrease the exact number 
of personnel that will be allowed to reenlist on a yearly 
basis. These terms of enlistment generally come in four-
year contracts, although occasionally extensions of up to 
one year are allowed. In times of drawdown, first-term 
reenlistments can get extremely competitive, particularly 
in high-capacity military occupational specialties (MOSs). 
Once a Marine has been selected for first-term 
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reenlistment, subsequent-term reenlistments are much easier 
to obtain as their “boat space” has been reserved, although 
it is important to note that the Marine is only obligated 
to complete the current four-year contract. Only 
detrimental actions from the Marine or times of extreme 
drawdown will make subsequent-term reenlistments difficult 
to get. This policy puts the focus on the initial 
reenlistment as the indicator for extended future service. 
The officer contract process is quite different from 
the enlisted contract process. There is an initial service 
requirement, which is generally four years. Longer 
requirements for high-skill jobs such as pilot can be up to 
eight years. If selected for a career path, officers can 
serve until they choose to resign or are forced to resign 
their commission (separate) due to legal or severe 
performance issues. In the initial term of service, junior 
Marine officers are vetted for selection for career 
opportunities. Until 2009, this process was called 
augmentation, wherein individuals competed within their MOS 
to augment to the career fleet. These selection rates could 
drop as low as 10% (Lamothe, 2009). Starting in 2009, the 
program changed to Career Designation, which divided the 
officer corps into five competitive categories: combat 
arms, combat support, aviation support, aviation, and law. 
Each category has a set selection rate. These processes are 
very important force-shaping tools as the number selected 
can change every year to meet the predicted need for 
officers. As a reenlistment and renewed contract every four 
years are not required, officers have more flexibility 
concerning how long they serve. 
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One way that a Marine may get involuntarily separated 
or forced to take retirement is for medical reasons. As 
expected, the military has certain physical requirements 
that must be met. If Marines are unable to do their jobs or 
complete physical and combat fitness tests for an extended 
period of time, they may be subject to a physical 
evaluation board. Informally called a med board, this 
process may take up to two years to complete, as the Marine 
is given time to either get in shape or recuperate from 
injury. Conducted by senior Navy medical personnel, the 
board must prove that the individual is either unable to 
recover fully enough to meet the standards, or that 
recovery will take such an extensive amount of time as to 
hinder the Marine’s ability to serve his or her term. 
Certain allowances are made for extreme circumstances on an 
individual basis, such as Marines nearing retirement, or 
those who request exemption, such as amputees who desire to 
continue service. The desires of the individual do play a 
role in these medical boards, although they may or may not 
affect the result. A desire to stay in the Service will 
generally increase the amount of time allowed by the board 
for the individual to correct this physical deficiency. 
The lifestyle of a Marine is a physically demanding 
one. Aside from meeting basic fitness requirements, 
physical demands include marching with loads, conducting 
field exercises, and defensive training such as martial 
arts. These practices wear down the body even in a 
garrison-training environment. In the combat environment, 
underlying or obvious threats increase the impact of mental 
stresses, as well as require a greater amount of protective 
gear. There is often an increased amount of nonstandard 
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work such as set up and teardown of fortifications, working 
environments, and living environments. Much of this is done 
outside, by hand, over long hours, and on limited sleep. 
This constant level of high exertion will take a toll on 
any individual, even if the person is a Marine. It would 
stand to reason that, in times of increased deployment 
activity, such levels of physical activity would increase 
wear on the body and therefore cause a greater number of 
issues that may lead to medical separation. 
B. PURPOSE 
1. Objectives 
The objective of this study is to establish a 
quantitative evaluation of the impact of the increased 
deployment tempo on the overall health of the Marine Corps 
and the long-term health impacts of women with combat 
deployments. I have also developed additional information 
such as the relationship between MOS and medical 
separation, the prevalence of various separation 
categories, and the overall impact that these have on the 
senior makeup of the Marine Corps. 
It is important to note that the objective of this 
study is not to add to or detract from the political and 
sociological debate concerning women in the armed forces 
and their role in combat zones, although the results are a 
basis for discussion on this topic. 
2. Primary Research Question 
What is the cause of medical separations for Marines 
who otherwise show intent to remain in the Service? 
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3. Secondary Research Questions 
a. How does gender affect medical separations? Do 
women leave the Marines more quickly, at a younger age, and 
at a higher rate than their male counterparts due to 
medical reasons? 
b. What is the effect of the increased deployment 
tempo caused by 9/11 on medical separations in the Marines? 
Does this effect vary by gender? 
c. Do separation causes vary by rank? 
C. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
1. Scope 
The scope of this study is all Marines, including 
officers and enlisted with greater than four years of 
service or following their first-term reenlistment who have 
separated from the Marine Corps between January 1, 1990 and 
December 31, 2011. The data set represents all Marines 
service members that met the study criteria, and is not a 
sample set. It does not include individuals still on active 
service, or those pending separation. It does include 
separated Selected Marine Corps Reservists and those who 
have moved to the Individual Ready Reserve, as they have a 
separation code. Many studies have been done to analyze the 
causes of attrition and success among first-term service 
members, but this study is focused on those who have 
actively selected to remain in the Marine Corps past their 
first term. I review the data from many angles. The pre- 
and post-9/11 angle directly addresses the increased 
deployment tempo following the September 11th attacks. 
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Further breakdown includes analysis of gender, MOS as it 
applies to Marine Corps major combat elements, and rank.  
2. Assumptions 
My primary assumption is that Marines with more than 
four years of service intend to stay at least 10 years, or 
would stay if they remained healthy, maintained standards, 
and did not have legal issues. This is based on the fact 
that 75% of Marines do not reenlist past the first term, 
and there is competition for first-term enlistments. 
(Wetzel, 2012) Those who choose to compete show their 
intent to remain. 
Another assumption is that a majority of medical 
discharges are either an acute result of military activity, 
or a cumulative result of physical wear over time due to 
the Marine Corps lifestyle. This level of physical wear is 
greater than would occur in a traditional civilian job and 
carries a great deal of personal risk. Contrarily, medical 
problems caused by actions not in the line of duty and due 
to a member’s misconduct are generally not the separation 
cause, because the legal separation code will take 
precedence 
3. Organization 
In the introduction and background, I provide the 
framework and establish the goal of the analysis. In the 
literature review in Chapter II, I highlight similar 
studies and establish the context for this study. In 
Chapter III, I provide the initial organized review of the 
body of data for this thesis. These summary statistics are 
shown from the angle of each research question. In Chapter 
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IV, I present the regression and estimation models and 
analyses, as well as a detailed discussion of each 
independent variable’s effect on the outcome. Regressions 
and probability estimations detail various interaction 
effects beyond the scope of summary statistics, and the 
results undergo a thorough analysis, both quantitative and 
qualitative. In Chapter V, I conclude the paper with a 
discussion of the findings and recommend areas for further 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
There is a great deal of literature and research 
concerning attrition and separation causes, as well as 
women in the service. However, almost all attrition reports 
focus on the first four years of service and are designed 
to assist with entry-level recruiting. Studies concerning 
women in the Service are often physiological or 
philosophical dissections as to why women should or 
shouldn’t participate in the armed services or fulfill 
combat roles. While this thesis is not aimed specifically 
at either of these topics, they are of relevance.  
Many of the works reviewed in preparation for this 
study are fellow Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) theses. I 
have reviewed them in order to help develop a methodology, 
but for the most part, the comparisons presented are not 
parallel. Regardless, much of the literature listed here 
lays the groundwork for the cultural military background of 
this study. The primary work listed here is Capt Katie 
Petronio’s (2012) article, as found in the Marine Corps 
Gazette, as it presents the basis for the questions I have 
answered with my analysis. 
B. ATTRITION AND SEPARATION 
1. A Study of Promotion and Attrition of Mid-Grade 
Officers in the U.S. Marine Corps: Are 
Assignments a Key Factor? (Morgan, 2005) 
This NPS master’s thesis by Marine Major Jerry R. 
Morgan (2005) was a study of promotion and attrition of 
mid-grade officers in the U.S. Marine Corps. The focus was 
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on the ratio of time spent in one’s primary MOS vice 
alternate billets, and how that ratio affected the chances 
of promotion to major as well as the inclination to stay in 
the Corps that long at all. He used survival analysis to 
further evaluate a Marine’s predilection to stay and the 
length of time they remain in the Service.  
Morgan’s (2005) study does provide some interesting 
information, but it only addressed completion of contract 
separations with a mention of unsatisfactory performance 
separations. He did not address medical or legal concerns, 
although this is not an unreasonable omission given the 
small percentage of mid-grade officers with these types of 
separations. He also only addressed mid-grade male 
officers—a limitation that served his purposes well but has 
little adaptability to this study. 
2. Forecasting Marine Corps Enlisted Attrition 
Through Parametric Modeling (Hall, 2009) 
Marine Captain Jeremy Hall wrote this quantitative NPS 
master’s thesis in 2009 to improve on the Marine Corps’ 
attrition forecasting. Rather than maintain the status quo 
by generating a yearly forecast, he attempted to create a 
way to provide a monthly snapshot for manpower planners via 
a detailed survival analysis. However, his termination 
point for the purposes of survival analysis was very non-
specific. All non-End of Active Service losses were grouped 
together instead of specified, such as legal or medical. 
Enlisted ranks with less than 12.5 years of service were 
analyzed. 
While this study provides an interesting analysis of 
hazard models, the author concluded that the results were 
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too detailed and time consuming to be of practical use. He 
was able to provide excellent survivability rates, but for 
very small subgroups of personnel within the whole scope of 
the data. Unfortunately, he did not provide data that could 
be used for comparison for the results found in this study. 
3. How Does Deployment Affect Retention of Military 
Personnel? (Fricker, 2003) 
Ronald D. Fricker is a RAND analyst who participated 
in a series of analyses starting in 2000 about the 
relationship between deployments and retention. While this 
brief was written in 2003, the data used was all pre-9/11. 
The most in-depth of these studies focused on mid-grade 
officers of all branches, but he provided a comprehensive 
review of his results for both enlisted and officer in this 
research brief. The hypothesis was that increased 
deployments would reduce overall retention. This was based 
on exit interviews with service members and popular 
assumption. However, the data for both enlisted and officer 
showed a positive relationship between deployments and 
retention. Further analysis broke down the deployment 
factor to hostile and non-hostile deployments. Hostile 
deployments showed a much smaller positive correlation, and 
began to show a small negative correlation as the number of 
deployments increased. 
Fricker (2003) recommended that more in-depth studies 
be done concerning deployment duration and location, as the 
data used for his studies were generic in this regard. He 
mentioned family separation information as well. One aspect 
that is most intriguing was the quality of those who 
remained in the Service after deployment. He made no overt 
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implications but, rather, suggested that it be a point of 
future consideration: did those who remained do so out of 
sense of duty and job satisfaction, or because of a lack of 
options? 
This study provides a very interesting look at the big 
picture concerning deployments and retention rates in the 
armed services. The data were somewhat generic, which was 
necessary for the intended scope. 
4. Study by Patterns of Marine Corps Reserve 
Continuation Behavior: Pre- and Post-9/11 
(Lizzaraga, 2011) 
Marine Corps Major Joseph Lizzaraga (2011) discussed 
pre- and post-9/11 behavior in the Selected Marine Corps 
Reserve in his recent NPS master’s thesis. As his focus was 
on reservists’ decisions to continue attending drill 
weekends after their six-year initial contracts, he was 
able to easily split the data into three main groups: pre-, 
overlap-, and post-9/11, based on where two key milestones 
fell, enlistment and continuation decision. His methodology 
included utility models, organizational behavior, and 
probit logistic regressions. 
The summary of this thesis indicated that reserve 
mobilizations increased the likelihood of continuation 
rates, implying that job satisfaction played a significant 
role in the decision to remain in the reserves. While 
Lizzaraga (2011) did not address any non-standard 
separations or breeches of contract, his findings of 
increased retention are very important to help understand 
the differences in the pre- and post-9/11 armed forces, 
particularly self-selection factors. 
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5. Success of First-Term Soldiers (Buddin, 2005) 
This RAND study by Richard Buddin (2005) focused on 
Army recruitment and retention practices, and provided a 
detailed report on the effects of gender on first-term 
attrition. In the results of a number of logistic 
regressions, he found that women were 20% more likely to 
attrite during the Delayed Entry Program, 34% more likely 
to attrite during Basic Combat Training, and 51% more 
likely to not complete their first term. Figure 2 provides 
a comprehensive overview. 
 
Figure 2.  Comparison of the Loss Profile for Men and Women 
(From Buddin, 2005) 
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Buddin (2005) did a great deal of comparative analysis 
at every level of observation but did little in-depth 
elaboration about potential physiological causes or 
specific reasons for the attritions, such as medical or 
legal reasons. The results, however, were very clear: women 
attrite at a much higher rate than men during their initial 
term of enlistment. 
C. GENDER 
1. Get Over It! We Are Not All Created Equal 
(Petronio, 2012) 
A recent article by Capt Katie Petronio (2012) in the 
Marine Corps Gazette titled “Get Over It! We Are Not All 
Created Equal” is more editorial than research report. 
Petronio is an engineering officer with two combat tours, 
to include a combat action ribbon, and presented an 
argument against allowing women in combat specialties due 
to unchangeable physical differences. Officer Candidate 
School injury attrition rates were mentioned, which were 
14% for women and 4% for men. Beyond that, she highlighted 
her personal experience and related injuries, among them 
restless legs, muscular atrophy, and skeletal atrophy, 
which are degenerative issues that affect anyone in a 
demanding, persistent, and highly kinetic environment, such 
as on deployment. However, she noted that over her combat 
tours, the rate of degeneration and atrophy appeared to be 
far more rapid than that of her male counterparts.  
While Capt Petronio was able to complete her tours 
successfully, the focus of the article is the potential 
long-term effects on females should they increase their 
time in combat roles. She stated, “I am confident that 
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should the Marine Corps attempt to fully integrate women 
into the infantry, we as an institution are going to 
experience a colossal increase in crippling and career-
ending medical conditions for females” (Petronio, 2012).  
Finding quantitative data to either confirm or deny 
this statement is the impetus of this thesis. Capt Petronio 
(2012) didn’t deny the ability of women to be successful in 
combat environments, but used her personal experience as a 
warning against attempting to make the combat arms MOS’ 
gender inclusive. However, this was based on single, 
personal experiences and training attrition rates, rather 
than a data analysis of the long-term consequences. This 
article was designed to provoke conversation, and it has 
done so at all levels of the military. 
2. The Decision to Allow Military Women into Combat 
Positions: A Study in Policy and Politics 
(Culler, 2000) 
This NPS master’s thesis by Navy Lieutenant and Naval 
Aviator Kristen Culler is a direct examination of the 
repeal of exclusionary laws against women in combat 
aviation. Much of this study focused on political and 
social aspects of women in the military, but there is 
information more pertinent to my thesis concerning female 
physiology. The author summarized many different sources 
rather than presenting original material, although she did 
provide commentary and organization. She presented physical 
fitness data with a general trend of women performing at 
reduced strength and endurance levels, given equal 
requirements. However, this study did not address the long-
term medical concerns of women. It did address career 
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ceilings and related social elements such as sexism and 
tokenism, but these were not specifically applied to 
separations. 
3. Women Serving in Combat Would Strengthen 
America’s Defense (Roush, 1991) 
Following the Gulf War of 1990, a new surge of 
national conversations about women in combat emerged. This 
article in particular presented an interesting angle on the 
debate concerning time lost from work due to pregnancy and 
medical issues. Naval Academy professor and retired Marine 
Colonel Paul E. Roush (1991) commented, 
It is true, of course, that lost time is an 
important aspect of the capabilities discussion. 
When we go beyond perceptions and dwell on data, 
however, an interesting pattern emerges. ... A 
1984 study calculated lost time for men and women 
for each year of their first enlistment. Lost time 
events hospitalization, confinement in a brig, and 
desertion or other unauthorized absence. During 
the first year, days of lost time for each 100 men 
was 2.5 times that for each 100 women. During the 
second, third and fourth years, lost time rates 
for men exceeded rates for women by factors of 
5.0, 4.1, and 3.5, respectively. (p. 59) 
He went on to describe differences in leadership 
styles between men and women and combat effectiveness of 
women in other militaries, and picked apart a number of 
smaller arguments, such as interpersonal bonding. As a 
Naval Academy graduate himself, he spoke of a time when 
there was one black man in his 1,300-member class, and of 
when fellow black teammates ate on the bus while their 
white counterparts sat inside the restaurant for football 
team dinners. He was emphasizing that time alters 
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perceptions, particularly when they are based on a 
“tradition” of bigotry (Roush, 1991).  
Analyzing aspects of time lost from work and the 
underlying social implications regarding perceptions of 
such for different social groups is an interesting angle 
that rarely enters the discussion. The original data from 
Roush’s study was from 1984; it would be a welcome 
challenge to recreate the effort and analyze the results. 
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III. DATA AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
A. DATA 
The data for this study is a universal set of all 
Marines with at least four years of service, and a 
separation date between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 
2011. It was consolidated from a single source, directly 
from the Marine Corps Total Data Force Warehouse (TDFW), 
Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters Marine Corps. 
There is a single observation for each individual, and it 
is a universal data set in that each observation is 
measured at the time of the Marine’s separation from active 
service, and every Marine who separated is represented. 
Those still serving on active duty are not represented in 
this data. This information is unclassified and does not 
contain the individuals’ social security numbers. TFDW 
provided a unique identifier code for each Marine officer 
in compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974. 
The original data came in two sets (1993-2001 and 
2001-2011) with matching variables. Prior to cleaning and 
coding, the raw data had 95,175 observations and 21 
variables. The only additional variable I created prior to 
creating analysis variables was a time dummy, to generate 
the ability to analyze the difference in data for those who 
separated before Sept 11, 2001, and after. I excluded just 
9.8% of observations due to incomplete data, leaving 85,864 
viable observations. The post-9/11 observations comprise 





















































1. Deployments and Separations 
Deployments are a key variable in this study. Due to 
changes in reporting requirements and lack of a universal 
reporting structure for short-term training deployments, a 
deployment is defined as participation in a major action 
that also incurs hazardous duty pay. The length of 
deployments is nonstandard, but many of the physical 
demands involved in deployments take place in the actual 
movement to and from the deployment area, making length of 
deployment less significant for the purposes of this study. 
An ideal study would identify deployment time by months or 
even days, but I believe that enough deployments, 
particularly post-9/11, are of a standard enough length to 
mitigate any bias due to deployment length. Shipboard 
deployments not specifically tied to a major operation are 
not tabulated for any observation in this sample. 
Typically, these are six-month rotations in a Navy fleet 
deployment undertaken by infantry, pilots, and a small 
number of support personnel. Other training deployments are 
also not included, particularly those in Southeast Asia 
where units may take up to six one-month deployments in a 
given year. 
There are 287 separation codes utilized in this study. 
Some of this can be attributed to identical separation 
reasons having been given multiple codes as administration 
practices developed over the time spread of the study. I 
have grouped them into nine minor categories, and further 
segmented them into five major categories for regression 
and estimation purposes (see Table 2).  
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Table 2.   Separation Codes 
The medical separation variable does not distinguish 
between severe or lesser disabilities, or mental or 
physical disabilities. Not only would this data be 
difficult to procure and display without violations of 
privacy, it is unnecessary for the goals of this study. Any 
Marine who is unable to serve due to a disability is a 
loss, regardless of the nature of the injury. My intent 
with this analysis is to examine the overall physical and 
mental degradation effects caused by the comprehensive 
hazards of military service in the Marine Corps. For this 
reason, retirement separations that are classified as 
either voluntary or involuntary and medically based are 
included. An involuntary medical retirement at 20 years is 
an indicator of physical degradation that prohibited a 
Marine from serving, but the Marine was able to remain long 
enough to retire vice separate on a purely medical basis.  
Without reviewing cases on an individual level, there 
is no way for me to specifically isolate a disability-based 
separation and relate it to a deployment. Medical 
separations are typically involuntary, but several codes 
Minor&Category N Percent Major&Category N Percent





















are voluntary. Voluntary codes account for a very small 
number of medical separation observations.  
Regular separations are voluntary and include 
completion of enlisted contract obligations, resignations 
of officers having completed all obligated service time, 
and retirements. Legal separations are involuntary and a 
direct result of judicial or non-judicial action, to 
include court-martial sentences and non-judicial misconduct 
results. Non-judicial actions are disciplinary measures 
exclusive to the military, and come with no civilian legal 
record entries other than a discharge rated below 
Honorable. Sub-standard performance such as fitness 
failures and failure to promote within a prescribed 
timeframe make up the substandard performance category, as 
well as irreconcilable training failures. The final 
separations category includes all other codes, including 
involuntary reduction-in-force force shaping methods, 
hardship discharges, homosexual conduct discharges, and 
many other categories. This includes post-Desert Storm 
involuntary troop drawdowns. Several of these codes have 
less than five observations. For the purposes of this 
study, I have included combat-related deaths as other, in 
order to eliminate bias in the medical separations 
category.  
The post-9/11 variable was generated to separate the 
data into two distinct eras. The date of separation chosen 
was September 11, 2001, even though the largest number of 
deployments did not begin until 2003. This is because I 
believe that the anticipation and build-up to war would 
still have an effect on Marines, physically and 
emotionally.  
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2. Demographics and Education 
My analysis uses a standard set of demographic 
information, including gender, race, ethnicity, and family 
structure. Female represents gender, because it is expected 
to be the variant from the norm. It is also the focus of a 
secondary question. Number of dependents is a snapshot of 
how many dependents a service member has at the time of 
separation. Dummy variables are generated to represent 
race, with the largest category, white, being the control. 
Black represents all African-Americans. Asian, Hawaiian, 
Alaskan, and American Indian are grouped into one category 
due to the small numbers in these categories. Hispanic is 
listed as an ethnic category vice race, but over half of 
those marking Hispanic ethnicity were in the declined to 
respond race category, and a majority of the rest listed 
race as white. These race categories were superseded by the 
ethnicity, and I replaced them with a Hispanic race 
category. 
Education is a proxy for individual drive, so much so 
that a high school diploma or equivalent is a requirement 
for almost all enlistment programs. As personal drive is 
relatively intangible and therefore difficult to measure, 
an individual’s pursuit of education past the minimum 
requirement of high school indicates their motivation to 
advance in comparison to peers. The education variables are 
high school, some college, bachelors, and postgraduate, 
which include master’s degrees and doctorates (see Figure 
3). In the regression analysis of the enlisted population, 
the control will be high school diploma. For the officer 
population analysis, the bachelor’s is the control, as it 
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is a requirement for a standard commission. Warrant 
officers are not required to have a degree, and that 
accounts for high school and partial-college observations. 
 
Figure 3.  Educational Spread 
The final category, religion, is included to control 
for any potential differences in the desire to stay in the 
military due to different religious affiliation. I did not 
expect it to have an active effect on the results in this 
study, as opposed to studies that concern primarily moral 
issues such as gay personnel serving in the military. 
3. Rank and Military 
NCOs are the most common enlisted category in this 
study, comprised of corporals and sergeants. After four 
years of service, almost any Marine with no major non-
judicial or judicial problems will have achieved the rank 
of NCO. The individuals who are non-NCOs in this study, 










Corporals, account for 65.35% of the legal separations, and 
they have been punitively demoted to this rank. In the 
fleet Marine Corps, SNCO comprises all senior enlisted 
ranks. For the purposes of this study, the SNCO variable is 
only staff sergeant and gunnery sergeant.  
The two senior ranks of staff NCO, E-8 and E-9, have 
divergent career paths. Technical specialists, master 
sergeants and master gunnery sergeants, focus on their MOS 
(MOS) and are considered to be subject-matter experts in 
this area. First sergeants and sergeants major are 
administrative and legal specialists who are selected to 
serve as senior enlisted advisors to commanding officers 
and generals.  
Warrant Officers are exclusively from the enlisted 
ranks. After eight years of service, a Marine can apply for 
a warrant to become a Limited Duty Officer (LDO) within 
their specialty. These Marines are considered to be duty 
experts in their fields. While this is a very competitive 
program, no degree is required. Some warrant officers 
become LDOs, who start at the rank of O-3E captains, and 
cap out at lieutenant colonel. LDOs are treated the same as 
regular commissioned officers for the purposes of this 
study; however, their years of service are likely to be 
much greater than their non-LDO peers.  
Company grade officers (CGOs) are 2nd lieutenants, 1st 
lieutenants, and captains. CGOs are more likely to be 
physically involved in their jobs and with their troops. 
Field grade officers (FGOs) are majors, lieutenant 
colonels, and colonels. General grade officers are rather 
limited in the Marine Corps, and this category includes all 




Table 3.   Rank Distribution 
The following military-specific demographics are 
helpful for understanding the type of individual who is 
separating, and why they do so. Age at separation is the 
age when the individual leaves active duty. The years of 
service variable shows the number of complete, satisfactory 
years served. This is over four years for every observation 
in this study, since the focus is on careerists. Only 25% 
of Marines elect to reenlist following their first tour, 
and 15% of those remain through retirement (Wetzel, 2012). 
The General Classification Test score is used to measure 
mental aptitude and the intellectual health of the fleet. 
It is adapted from the General Technical score of the Armed 
Services Vocational Ability test. Less than 1% of the 
observations had clearly miscoded GCT scores; these scores 
were replaced with the median score in order to retain 
those observations. 
Military specialties could very well affect the type 
















cause a greater physical drain than others. The Marine 
Corps divides itself into three major job categories. The 
Ground Combat Element (GCE) includes infantry, artillery, 
tanks, engineers, and other direct combat jobs. This is 
very male-dominated as most MOSs in this category are male-
only. The only women in this category are combat engineers; 
this MOS is open to women, but is very limited as to the 
units to which they may be attached. The Aviation Combat 
Element (ACE) is aviation. This includes pilots and 
aircrew, air traffic control, expeditionary airfield units, 
and aircraft maintenance. The Logistics Combat Element 
(LCE) is often identified as combat service support, and 
contains all other MOS’ required to maintain the fleet, 
such as administration, finance, and motor transport. 
Appendix A provides a detailed picture of this breakdown of 
these three job categories. 
B. SUMMARY DATA STATISTICS 
Prior to developing econometric models, reviewing the 
data in summary tables provides some interesting 
information. This section details those summaries. I 
present a more in-depth analysis in Chapter IV. 
1. Grouping the Data—Pre- and Post-9/11 
Ideologies and strategic-level narratives aside, the 
events of September 11th had a profound impact on the armed 
forces. The knowledge of an almost certain war deployment 
shifted the type of individual who would not only join the 
Service, but remain in the Service. On top of that, 
increased deployment tempos mean a greater stress on the 
individual Marine and their families. The physical demands 
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of deployments include traveling and living under austere 
conditions and carrying the increased weight loads needed 
for set up and teardown of working and living areas. Daily 
activity in a combat deployment requires an average combat 
load of approximately 63 lbs, the estimate for ground 
troops serving in Afghanistan in 2004 (U.S. Army Soldier 
Systems Center, 2004). 
The pre-9/11 decade, from 1990-2001 and including 
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, had an average of 0.298 
deployments per Marine, with only 27.64% having at least 
one deployment. The Long War in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
represented in this study by the years 2001-2011, produced 
an average 1.259 deployments per Marine, with 56.42% of 
Marines having at least one deployment. Pre-9/11 had only 
713 Marines with two or more deployments, whereas post-
9/11, 21,333 Marines have two or more (see Table 4). 
The dramatic increase in deployment tempo marked by a 
single event provides us with an unprecedented opportunity 
to understand the effects of increased deployments. 
Intuitively, an increase in such physically demanding 
rotations would be matched with a relative increase in 




Table 4.   Pre- and Post-9/11 Descriptive Statistics 
Overall Pre(9/11 Post(9/11
Average(deployments(per(Marine 0.84(((((((((((( 0.30(((((((((((( 1.26((((((((((((
Deployments
No(deployments 55.79% 72.36% 43.57%
One(deployment 18.54% 25.68% 13.27%
Two(or(more(deployments 25.68% 1.96% 43.15%
Separation/Cause
Contract(Separation 62.84% 57.56% 66.74%
Medical(Separation 16.97% 19.27% 15.28%
PerformanceIbased(Separation 5.26% 6.35% 4.46%
Legal(Separation 10.19% 10.91% 9.67%
Other(Separations 4.73% 5.92% 3.85%
Personal/Status
Female 6.53% 6.31% 6.69%
Married 71.33% 71.22% 71.41%
#(of(dependents 1.78 1.83 1.74
Religion
Protestant(Christian 53.43% 55.11% 52.19%
Catholic 28.10% 28.61% 27.72%
Other(religion 18.47% 16.28% 20.08%
Race
Caucasian 72.58% 74.00% 71.54%
AfricanIAmerican 16.14% 18.72% 14.24%
Hispanic 8.65% 5.80% 10.75%
Asian(or(Native(American 2.63% 1.47% 3.48%
Education
High(School 75.13% 78.78% 72.44%
Some(college 4.73% 4.52% 4.88%
Bachelor's(Degree 14.20% 12.11% 15.74%
Masters(or(Doctorate 5.95% 4.58% 6.95%
Rank
All(enlisted 78.67% 82.04% 76.19%
All(officers 21.33% 17.96% 23.81%
Job/Category
Ground(Combat(Element 27.17% 25.16% 28.65%
Logistics(Combat(Element 49.89% 50.40% 49.51%
Air(Combat(Element 22.94% 24.44% 21.84%
Military/Demographics
Years(of(service 11.41 11.05 11.68
GCT(score 110.92 111.08 110.79
Age(at(separation 31.17 30.82 31.43
Observations 85,864 36,427 49,437
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2. Dependent Variable: Medical Separation 
The primary dependent variable for this study is 
whether an individual has a medical separation code. 
Medical disability can be the result of a single 
catastrophic injury or a series of smaller injuries over 
time. I have selected the independent variables that 
address probable reasons for these separations, as well as 
provide a picture of the type of service member that 
medically separates. The descriptive statistics shown in 
Table 5 provide a summary of these factors. 
To interpret this table, note that each category 
represents a percentage of the total. For instance, females 
are 8.61% of all medical separations. Looking at the 
deployments category, we see that those with no deployments 
are 59.99% of medical separations, those with one 
deployment are 18.01%, and those with two or more 
deployments are 22.00%. Surprisingly, those having two 
deployments or more contribute less to medical separations 
than they do to non-medical separations. The detailed 
analysis and regression in Chapter IV offers a closer look 
at this data, specifically. 
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3. The Gender Variable 
The impetus for this thesis was an article in the July 
2012 Marine Corps Gazette written by Capt Katie Petronio, a 
peer and classmate.  
In the end, my main concern is not whether women 
are capable of conducting combat operations, as we 
have already proven that we can hold our own in 
some very difficult combat situations; instead, my 
main concern is a question of longevity. Can women 
endure the physical and physiological rigors of 
sustained combat operations, and are we willing to 
accept the attrition and medical issues that go 
along with integration? 
She noted that the Marine Corps has done little to no 
research on the long-term effects of increased deployment 
and combat operations, and stated that she felt that a 
combat-specific MOS would be greatly detrimental to the 
already small female population. Several studies have shown 
that female attrition from recruitment through their first 
term is much higher overall,1 but by studying only those who 
would be defined as careerists, I isolate the effects on 
female career length. There is validity to the concern that 
women trend towards leaving the Service earlier; if women 
are becoming medically separated at a higher rate than men, 
fewer will push to the essential senior ranks. As women are 
already an overwhelming minority in the Marine Corps, even 
a small increase in early separations will have a 
detrimental impact. While this study does not review the 
political or social aspects of having women in leadership 
                     
1 A 2005 RAND study showed increased attrition for Army women in the 
Delayed Entry Program through the first term, with only 40 of 100 women 
completing the term of service, as opposed to 59 of 100 men, all other 
things equal. Interestingly, those women that completed the first term 
had a slightly higher reenlistment rate than men (Buddin, 2005). 
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roles, there is legitimate cause to analyze the potential 
reasons for such a decline. 
Prior to developing the methodology and conducting the 
regression, I again review the descriptive statistics, this 
time delineated by the gender variable (see Table 6). For 
many variables such as GCT score, rank, and age at 
separation, men and women are strikingly similar. However, 
variables such as deployments, years of service, and causes 
of separation show relatively large gender differences. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that the percentage of 
deployments for both men and women, both pre- and post-
9/11, have increased significantly. Figure 4 demonstrates 
this visually. 
 































































4. The Rank Variables—Enlisted and Officer 
Differences between the officer and enlisted ranks are 
expected. Officers must have completed a four-year degree 
to be eligible for a commission at all. A small exception 
here is the warrant officer, who is an enlisted Marine who 
serves at least eight years in a specialty before applying 
for an officer’s warrant. While a bachelor’s degree gives 
these Marines an advantage among their peers, it is not 
required. Physically, officers must have a first-class 
physical fitness test upon completion of entry-level 
training, while enlisted may qualify with a first-, second-
, or third-class test.  
Although the two previous variables are highly 
quantitative, a less measurable factor is the type of work 
done by officers. Officers tend to be more focused on 
organization and paperwork, vice the more physical demands 
of enlisted jobs. Truly comparing different job quality and 
difficulty between enlisted and officer workloads is 
destined for another study entirely; however, it is 
commonly accepted in the Marine Corps that daily physical 
demands on the job are, on average, less significant for 
officers. Due to the factors listed above, as well as 
demographic differences, I have divided the regression 
analyses in Chapter IV into officer and enlisted 
observations. Table 7 provides overall enlisted and officer 
descriptive statistics. Appendix C provides an additional 
breakdown by nine rank categories. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY, RESULTS, AND INTERPRETATION 
A. METHODOLOGY 
1. Primary Regression Model 
 The main model for this analysis is the Linear 
Probability Model (LPM)—a common method used when 
calculating a binomial dependent variable, such as the 
medical separations variable. A binomial variable either 
happens or does not happen, as opposed to a continuous 
variable. An LPM uses Ordinary Least Squares calculations 
to estimate the coefficients, which generate a linear curve 
that represents the relationship between expected and 
observed data. It does this by minimizing the squares of 
the deviation between observed and expected. This study 
utilizes an LPM, vice probit, due to the LPM’s ease of 
calculation and interpretation of the marginal effects in 
the context of interaction terms. To mitigate concerns 
about heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors are 
utilized. Additional concerns with LPM over alternative 
models will be addressed later in this chapter.  
 
The regression in Equation (1) provides a baseline 
look at how the independent variables affect those who 
medically separate. This answers the primary research 
question of this thesis, “What is the cause of medical 
separations for Marines who otherwise show intent to remain 
in the Service?” It also provides a baseline for all 
푀푒푑푖푐푎푙!푆푒푝푎푟푎푡푖표푛 =
훽!퐺푒푛푑푒푟+ !훽!!푂푛푒!퐷푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡!+ !훽!푇푤표!표푟!푀표푟푒!퐷푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡푠!+!훽!!푃표푠푡!911+ !훽!!푃푒푟푠표푛푎푙!퐷푒푚표푔푟푎푝ℎ푖푐푠+ !훽!!푀푖푙푖푡푎푟푦!퐷푒푚표푔푟푎푝ℎ푖푐푠+ 휀 (1) 
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follow-on questions. As stated in Chapter III, the key 
variables are gender, deployments, and time period. 
Deployments are divided into three categories: no 
deployments, one deployment, or two or more deployments. 
Personal demographics include dummies for race, religion, 
marital status, and education. Military demographics 
include rank, job category, GCT score, years of service, 
and age at separation. All regressions in this study are 
calculated twice and with distinct groups of data; this is 
to allow for differences between the enlisted and officer 
communities. The results section will clearly note these 
distinctions. 
For means of comparison, the medical separation 
regression is run and shown next to the other major 
separation categories as dependent variables, regular, 
substandard performance, legal, and other. These results 
are found in Appendix D. 
2. Models Including Interaction Terms 
An interaction model is merely a modification of the 
LPM through the addition of interactive variables as 
regressors. Multiplicative interaction terms test a 
conditional hypothesis, defined as a hypothesis in which “a 
relationship between two or more variables depends on the 
value of one or more other variables” (Golder, Brambor, & 
Clark, 2006, p. 4).  
In Equation (2), I investigate whether the effects of 
the Long War on medical separation differ by gender. I add 
an interaction term for females and time period. The 
coefficient of the interaction term gives an idea of the 
specific impact of being a female in the post-9/11 era. 
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It is important to include the main effects variables 
as well as the interactive variable, because the 
coefficients of the constructive terms provide values for 
those times in which both multiplicative values are not 
present. For instance, if Post911 = 0 because the 
observation is from before 9/11, the interaction term also 
equals zero. However, the constructive term gender still 
captures the effects of that observation. 
In Equation (3), I investigate whether the effects of 
the number of deployments on medical separation differ by 
gender. The categorical variable of deployments has been 
pared down into three dummy variables. These are no 
deployments, one deployment, and two or more deployments. 
This allows for a level of specificity without 
overcomplicating the results.  
 
In Equation (4), I investigate whether the effects of 
the Long War on medical separation differ by the number of 
deployments. This isolates the effects of the types of 
deployments and the constant tempo during the Long War. 
These deployments are generally of a standard duration, 
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훽!퐺푒푛푑푒푟+ !훽!!푂푛푒!퐷푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡!+ !훽!푇푤표!표푟!푀표푟푒!퐷푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡푠!+!훽!!푃표푠푡!911+ !훽! 퐺푒푛푑푒푟 ∗ 푂푛푒!푑푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡 +!훽! 퐺푒푛푑푒푟 ∗ 푇푤표!표푟!푀표푟푒!퐷푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡푠 + !훽!!푃푒푟푠표푛푎푙!퐷푒푚표푔푟푎푝ℎ푖푐푠+!훽!!푀푖푙푖푡푎푟푦!퐷푒푚표푔푟푎푝ℎ푖푐푠+ !휀 
(3) 
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between six and eight months in the Marine Corps, and to 
the same operational theatre in the Middle East. For the 
purposes of this study, it is not necessary to take into 
account the specific deployment location. 
 
3. Probit Estimation Model 
One major concern with an LPM is that there is a 
possibility that some of the predicted probabilities will 
fall outside the unit interval, meaning the result will be 
outside {0, 1}. In addition, the error term in an LPM 
suffers from heteroskedasticity, meaning that the variance 
of the dependent variable is different with any diverse set 
of independent variable values. Because the value of the 
error term is dependent on the values of the independent 
variables, a classical regression assumption is violated. 
Also, the error term is not normally distributed, which is 
another assumption violation.  
Econometric developments for binary response models 
have created a different type of regression called a 
probability unit regression, or probit. A probit model is a 
nonlinear estimation method and calculates the maximum 
likelihood of a binary outcome, the dependent variable, 
given a set of circumstances, that is, independent 
variables. Traditionally, probit models have been 
computationally more difficult to implement, but relatively 
푀푒푑푖푐푎푙!푆푒푝푎푟푎푡푖표푛 =
훽!퐺푒푛푑푒푟+ !훽!!푂푛푒!퐷푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡!+ !훽!푇푤표!표푟!푀표푟푒!퐷푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡푠!+!훽!!푃표푠푡!911+ !훽! 푃표푠푡911 ∗ 푂푛푒!푑푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡 +!훽! 푃표푠푡911 ∗ 푇푤표!표푟!푀표푟푒!퐷푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡푠 + !훽!!푃푒푟푠표푛푎푙!퐷푒푚표푔푟푎푝ℎ푖푐푠+!훽!!푀푖푙푖푡푎푟푦!퐷푒푚표푔푟푎푝ℎ푖푐푠+ !휀 
(4) 
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recent developments in statistical software have eliminated 
this concern and greatly increased accessibility of the 
probit model.  
All LPM models I have described so far are also 
estimated using the probit method, for the purpose of 
comparison. The major advantage of the probit model over 
the LPM is that the predicted probabilities will not be out 
of bound. The drawback of this class of nonlinear 
regression model is that the interpretation of the 
coefficients on the interaction terms is more difficult 
compared to the LPM, yet some of the key results of this 
thesis rely on the interpretation of these interaction 
terms. However, direction, magnitude, and significance 
levels of the marginal effects from the main model are 
expected to be very similar between both types of 
estimation methods. 
 
B. ENLISTED RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
Prior to embarking on a series of regressions and 
estimations, it is important to have the appropriate data 
for the task at hand. As I mentioned previously, the data 
is next divided into enlisted and officer. This is a 
standard delineation for military personnel studies and is 
helpful for analysis and application of the results. The 
background and demographics are very different between 
Pr!( 푀푒푑푖푐푎푙!푆푒푝푎푟푎푡푖표푛) = 1 푥 = Φ( !!!"#$"% + !!!! "#! "#$%&'"()!+ !!!!"#!!"! "#$! "#$%&'"()*!+ !!!!!"#$!911+ !!!!!"#$%&'(! "#$%&'(ℎ!"#+ !!!! "#"$%&'! "#$%&'(ℎ!"# + !!) 
(5) 
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officers and enlisted, as well as job expectations and 
military contract execution. 
The reference observation in the enlisted models is a 
Caucasian, single, Protestant male with a high school 
degree or equivalency who is a noncommissioned officer 
serving in the GCE.  
1. Linear Probability Models 
As discussed in section A, there are four models; the 
first has no interaction terms and functions as a base for 
comparison. Almost every coefficient in this model is 
statistically significant to the 1% level; however, it is 
important to note that statistical significance merely 
implies that the results are not due to random chance. 
Direction—positive or negative—and magnitude of the 
coefficients are also key elements in determining the 
importance of a variable coefficient. For instance, in 
column (a) of Table 8, the effect of being a female 
increases the probability of medical separation by 6.86 
percentage points,2 all other things equal. This has 
statistical significance, a positive effect, and a 
relatively large magnitude, compared to the baseline 
medical separation rate of 33.77%.  
Relative to all separations in this dataset, medical 
separations decreased by 4.82 percentage points in the 
                     
2 The term percentage point vice percent eliminates ambiguity in the 
results. In this case, the constant is 21.58%, and saying that the 
effect of being an officer reduces the probability of medical 
separation by 9.43 percent could mean 9.43% of 21.58%, which is 21.58-
2.035 = 19.45%. This is an incorrect interpretation, however. The 
correct interpretation is that the effect of being an officer reduces 
the probability of medical separation by 9.43 percentage points, or 
21.58-9.43 = 12.15%. 
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post-9/11 era compared to the pre-9/11 era. Deployments 
also have a negative impact on medical separation: those 
deployed once have a 1.07–percentage points lower 
probability of being medically separated compared to those 
with no deployments, and those deployed more than once have 
a 1.42–percentage points lower probability of being 
medically discharged than those not deployed. Despite the 
intense physical nature of deployment, those who are 
actively deploying have a reduced number of medically based 
separations. While this might seem counterintuitive at 
first, this is possibly due to selection bias; those who 
deploy may be less likely to be medically separated because 
they are physically fit for deployment in the first place. 
On the other hand, those who are not physically prepared 
for deployment are screened out during the pre-deployment 
screening. Unfortunately, the data at hand does not allow a 
further inquiry into the extent of this selection bias. 
I believe that some of the results are more intuitive 
as to their cause; for instance, the increased rate of 
medical separations for the two most senior enlisted ranks 
(by 28.5 and 35.35 percentage points, relatively) when 
compared to noncommissioned officers, is likely the result 
of a long, demanding career in the Marine Corps. A master 
sergeant or mastery gunnery sergeant has a predicted 
probability of medical separation of almost 70%.3 Inversely, 
being an E1/E2/E3 in this survey has an 11.01–percentage 
point lower probability of medical separation compared to a 
noncommissioned officer. But as Appendix D shows, this rank 
group has a 53.83–percentage point higher probability of 
                     
3 Note that the medical separation variable also includes retirement 
separations due to temporary or permanent disability. 
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being legally separated compared to the reference ranks. 
This accounts for the lower medical separation probability. 
Job categories also appear to be significant 
predictors of medical separation among those separated. 
Being in the ACE reduces the probability of medical 
separation by 6.67 percentage points relative to those in 
the GCE, while the LCE has a 4.98–percentage point 
reduction. One potential explanation for the lower rate for 
aviator is the hesitancy of aviation personnel to report 
medical concerns due to the extremely high standards of 
physical fitness needed for flight status. Of course, no 
Marine will deny that the physical demands of the GCE are 
much higher, an assertion that is verified by this 
analysis. 
I have aligned the four LPMs into Table 8 for ease of 
comparison. Column (a) is the base model with no 




Table 8.   Enlisted Linear Probability Models 
Because this is an LPM, interaction effects can be 
calculated through basic arithmetic. The model in column 
(b) tests whether the effect of post-9/11 on medical 
separation differs between male and female Marine enlisted. 
Isolating the interactions in column (b) helps interpret 
the results. The interaction term between female and post-
9/11 era has a negative magnitude and is statistically 
significant, suggesting that females are less likely to be 
Key$Variables
Female 0.0686*** (0.0069) 0.1007*** (0.0109) 0.0796*** (0.0080) 0.0684*** (0.0069)
Post59/11 70.0482*** (0.0036) 70.0440*** (0.0037) 70.0484*** (0.0036) 70.0616*** (0.0042)
One5deployment 70.0107*** (0.0041) 70.0099** (0.0041) 70.0099** (0.0042) 70.0308*** (0.0053)








Married 70.0016 (0.0043) 70.0019 (0.0043) 70.0019 (0.0043) 70.0013 (0.0043)
#5of5dependents 0.0043*** (0.0014) 0.0044*** (0.0014) 0.0043*** (0.0014) 0.0043*** (0.0014)
Religion
Catholic 70.0123*** (0.0039) 70.0123*** (0.0039) 70.0124*** (0.0039) 70.0124*** (0.0039)
Other/No5religion 70.0154*** (0.0040) 70.0154*** (0.0040) 70.0154*** (0.0040) 70.0156*** (0.0040)
Race
African7American 70.0296*** (0.0042) 70.0299*** (0.0042) 70.0298*** (0.0042) 70.0290*** (0.0042)
Hispanic 70.0562*** (0.0051) 70.0563*** (0.0051) 70.0561*** (0.0051) 70.0563*** (0.0051)
Asian5or5Native5American 70.0409*** (0.0089) 70.0406*** (0.0088) 70.0405*** (0.0089) 70.0408*** (0.0088)
Education
Some5college 0.0048 (0.0073) 0.0051 (0.0073) 0.0048 (0.0073) 0.0049 (0.0073)
Bachelors5or5Higher 70.0439*** (0.0092) 70.0437*** (0.0092) 70.0439*** (0.0092) 70.0443*** (0.0092)
Rank
E1/E2/E3 70.1101*** (0.0045) 70.1105*** (0.0045) 70.1103*** (0.0045) 70.1107*** (0.0045)
E6/E7 0.0547*** (0.0039) 0.0548*** (0.0039) 0.0548*** (0.0039) 0.0547*** (0.0039)
E8/E951stSgt/SgtMaj5 0.2850*** (0.0155) 0.2857*** (0.0155) 0.2849*** (0.0155) 0.2870*** (0.0155)
E8/E95MSgt/MGySgt 0.3535*** (0.0143) 0.3542*** (0.0143) 0.3538*** (0.0143) 0.3543*** (0.0143)
Job$Category
Logistics5Combat5Element 70.0498*** (0.0038) 70.0497*** (0.0038) 70.0494*** (0.0038) 70.0500*** (0.0038)
Air5Combat5Element 70.0667*** (0.0045) 70.0663*** (0.0045) 70.0662*** (0.0045) 70.0664*** (0.0045)
Military$Demographics
GCT5score 70.0004*** (0.0001) 70.0004*** (0.0001) 70.0004*** (0.0001) 70.0004*** (0.0001)
Years5of5service 70.0305*** (0.0007) 70.0304*** (0.0007) 70.0304*** (0.0007) 70.0304*** (0.0007)
Age5at5separation 0.0094*** (0.0006) 0.0094*** (0.0006) 0.0094*** (0.0006) 0.0095*** (0.0006)
Constant 0.3377*** (0.0218) 0.3389*** (0.0218) 0.3386*** (0.0218) 0.3380*** (0.0218)
Observations 67,550 67,550 67,550 67,550
Adjusted5R7squared 0.0466 0.0469 0.0468 0.0471
Robust5standard5errors5in5parentheses
***5p<0.01,5**5p<0.05,5*5p<0.1
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Medical5Separation Medical5Separation Medical5Separation Medical5Separation
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medically separated than males in the post-9/11 era, 
compared to their medical separation rate differences in 
the pre-9/11 era. Using marginal probabilities, as reported 
in Table 8, Figure 5 illustrates the differences in 
predicted probability by era and by gender. 
 
Figure 5.  Gender * Post911 Computation Matrix4 
This 2x2 table shows that in the pre-9/11 era, 
predicted probability of medical separation is 33.89% for 
male and 43.96% for female—a 10.07–percentage point 
difference. In the post-9/11 era, predicted probability of 
medical separation went down for both genders: 29.49% for 
male and 33.9% for female, resulting in the rate difference 
being narrowed to 4.41 percentage points. 
The deployment effects in column (c) of Table 8 are a 
little more involved, since there are two dummies that need 
to be isolated. Because the variables one deployment and 
two or more deployments handle the same type of information 
and are mutually exclusive, they can be put into the same 
                     
4 Interpretation is based on a subset of coefficients: 
 
 퐺푒푛푑푒푟 = 0 (Male) 퐺푒푛푑푒푟 = 1 (Female) 
푃표푠푡911 = 0 0.3389 0.3389 + 0.1007 = 
0.4396 
푃표푠푡911 = 1 0.3389 + -0.0440 = 
0.2949 
0.3389 + 0.1007 + 




model. As done with column (b), I isolate the interaction 
effects of column (c), shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.  Gender * One Deployment Matrix (* Denotes 
Insignificant Effect) 
While the variables female and one deployment are both 
significant to at least 5%, the interaction effect is not 
within 10% statistical significance. This infers that the 
effect of this interaction is equal to zero, and cannot be 
interpreted. The next interaction term is shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  Gender * Two or More Deployments Matrix 
 !"#$"% = 0 (Male) !"#$"% = 1 (Female) !"#! "#$%&'"() = 0 0.3386 0.3386 + 0.0796 = 
0.4182 !"#! "#$%&'"() = 1 0.3386 + -0.0099 = 
0.3287 
0.3386 + 0.0796 + 
-0.0099 + 0* = 
0.4083 
 
 퐺푒푛푑푒푟 = 0 (Male) 퐺푒푛푑푒푟 = 1 (Female) 
푇푤표!표푟!푀표푟푒!퐷푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡푠= 0 0.3386 0.3386 + 0.0796 = 0.4182 




The interaction effects of being a female with two or 
more deployments are highly statistically significant, have 
a negative effect on the probability of medical separation, 
and have a relatively high magnitude. The 2x2 table in 
Figure 7 shows that with no deployments, predicted 
probability of medical separation is 33.86% for male and 
41.82% for female—an eight–percentage point difference. 
However, with two or more deployments, predicted 
probability of medical separation went down slightly for 
males to 32.79%, but dropped to 32.01% for females. This 
results in the rate difference being not only narrowed by 
almost nine percentage points, but showing a reversal in 
gender for having a higher rate of medical separations 
relative to all separation causes. 
The causes of this shift are possibly the uneven 
number of males in the GCE, vice the LCE and ACE.5 Though 
not directly related to my original research questions, I 
also consider here whether the interaction effect between 
combat element and deployment is relevant. Even with a 
cursory look at the results shown in Table 9, the 
significance, magnitude, and direction of the interaction 
variables indicate that medical separations have a much 
greater probability for GCE Marines in relation to LCE and 
ACE. Table 9 and Figures 8-10 show the specific 
interactions between combat elements and deployments.  
                     
5 Actual combat operations are not part of these calculations; 
however, the purpose of this study is to evaluate the overall impact of 
the increased deployment tempo on the health of the force, so the 
impact of this missing data is negligible. 
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Table 9.   Enlisted Linear Probability Key Variables With 
Combat Element and Deployment Interaction Terms 
 
Figure 8.  GCE * Two or More Deployments Matrix 
The most numerically significant variable seems to be 
those with two or more deployments. An enlisted Marine 
serving in the GCE with two or more deployments has a 
40.66% probability of medically separating relative to 
members of the GCE with no deployments, an increase of 
Key$Variables
Female 0.0686*** (0.0069) 0.0663*** (0.0069) 0.0671*** (0.0069) 0.0687*** (0.0069)
Post59/11 70.0482*** (0.0036) 70.0484*** (0.0036) 70.0483*** (0.0036) 70.0483*** (0.0036)
One5deployment 70.0107*** (0.0041) 70.0202*** (0.0047) 70.0025 (0.0059) 70.0064 (0.0047)
Two5or5more5deployments 70.0142*** (0.0040) 70.0353*** (0.0045) 0.0075 (0.0055) 70.0109** (0.0044)
Ground5Combat5Element5(GCE) 0.0399*** 70.0058
Logistics5Combat5Element5(LCE) 70.0498*** (0.0038) 0.0171*** 70.0039 70.0340*** (0.0049) 70.0492*** (0.0038)








Constant 0.3377*** (0.0218) 0.3179*** (0.0220) 0.3318*** (0.0218) 0.3347*** (0.0219)
Observations 67,550 67,550 67,550 67,550
Adjusted5R7squared 0.0466 0.0475 0.0471 0.0466
Robust5standard5errors5in5parentheses
***5p<0.01,5**5p<0.05,5*5p<0.1
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Medical5Separation Medical5Separation Medical5Separation Medical5Separation
 퐺퐶퐸 = 0 퐺퐶퐸 = 1 
푇푤표!표푟!푀표푟푒!퐷푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡푠= 0 0.3377 0.3377 + 0.0399 = 0.3776 




three percentage points. This is also over 10 percentage 
points higher relative to Marines who are not in the GCE. 
Members of the LCE and ACE have 25.91% and 24.86% 
probability, respectively, of medical separation over all 
other separation causes relative to those with no 
deployments. So overall, GCE Marines with two or more 
deployments have a 10–percentage point increase in 
probability of medical separation when compared to those 
not in the GCE, while LCE and ACE Marines with two or more 
deployments show a drop of four and three percentage points 
when compared with those not in their communities. 
 
Figure 9.  LCE * Two or More Deployments Matrix 
 퐿퐶퐸 = 0 퐿퐶퐸 = 1 
푇푤표!표푟!푀표푟푒!퐷푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡푠= 0 0.3318 0.3318 + -0.0340 = 0.2978 





Figure 10.  ACE * Two or More Deployments Matrix 
The final model in the enlisted results section 
evaluates the impact of deployments pre- and post-9/11, 
regardless of gender. The most recent war in the Middle 
East has created a sustained deployment environment not 
experienced in recent military history, and certainly not 
since the advent of the all-volunteer force in 1973. The 
relative peace of the 1990s followed by a singular event 
leading to a sustained deployment environment provides an 
ideal opportunity to study the effects of said deployments 
on Marines. The data found in column (d) of Table 8 gives 
us the data to analyze these effects (see Figures 11-12). 
 
Figure 11.  Post-9/11 * One Deployment Matrix 
 퐴퐶퐸 = 0 퐴퐶퐸 = 1 
푇푤표!표푟!푀표푟푒!퐷푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡푠= 0 0.3347 0.3347 + -0.0594 = 0.2753 
푇푤표!표푟!푀표푟푒!퐷푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡푠= 1 0.3347 + -0.0109 = 0.3238 0.3347 + -0.0594 + -0.0109 + -0.0158 
= 0.2486 
 
 푃표푠푡911 = 0 푃표푠푡911 = 1 
푂푛푒!퐷푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡 = 0 0.3380 0.3380 + -0.0616 = 
0.2764 
푂푛푒!퐷푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡 = 1 0.3380 + -0.0308 = 
0.3072 
0.3380 + -0.0616 + 





Figure 12.  Post-9/11 * Two or More Deployments Matrix 
In the pre-9/11 era, enlisted Marines with no 
deployments have a 33.8% probability of medical separation 
relative to all separations. Probability drops three 
percentage points with one deployment, and an additional 
three for more than one deployment for a total of a six–
percentage point drop to 27.33% probability. As deployments 
increase in the post-9/11 period, medical separations 
fluctuate from 27.64% with no deployments, up to 28.85% 
with one, and back down to 27.33% with two. Compared to the 
pre-9/11 era, there is a six–percentage point drop in 
medical separation probability when evaluating post-9/11 
Marines with no deployments, a two–percentage point drop 
when comparing those with one deployment, and only a 0.11–
percentage point drop when comparing those with two or more 
deployments, making the difference in probabilities almost 
even. 
2. Probit Estimation Models 
There are significant computation hurdles to finding 
the interaction effects in a nonlinear estimation model 
such as a maximum-likelihood probit model. A cadre of 
 푃표푠푡911 = 0 푃표푠푡911 = 1 
푇푤표!표푟!푀표푟푒!퐷푒푝푙표푦푚푒푛푡푠= 0 0.3380 0.3380 + -0.0616 = 0.2764 




econometricians has worked to create a new statistical 
software model to address these concerns, and it is 
certainly possible (Norton, Wang, & Ai, 2004, pp. 154-167). 
However, the depth and scope of my thesis does not require 
such an extensive process. The LPM provides accessible 
interaction effects and statistically viable results. It is 
prudent to verify the significance, direction, and 
magnitude of the LPMs by comparing them to a probit model. 
This is due to concerns of inconsistency and bias of the 
results and marginal effects. My primary point of concern 
with an LPM is that of boundedness, defined as the 
necessity for predicted probabilities to reside within [0, 
1]. There is no way to constrain the results of an LPM 
within this parameter as the OLS model mathematically 
assumes that changes in the independent variables have a 
constant effect on the dependent variable, whether a unit 
change is from 0 to 1, or from 103 to 104. While the 
effects of this lessen with binary dummy variables, 
inconsistent and biased results are still an issue.  
I am not directly interpreting the results of the 
probit estimation models, but they are shown in Appendix D. 
The coefficients are the calculated derivative marginal 
probability effects for the discrete change of dummy 
variable from 0 to 1, or for a one-unit change in the mean 
value of a continuous independent variable. The “observed 
P” in these models is the probability of medical separation 
at the mean value of all independent variables. 
While the magnitude of the coefficients varies between 
the LPM and the probit models, they are similar. Direction 
and significance levels are the same. These factors 
indicate that the LPM is a decent fit to the data, relative 
to the probit results.  
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C. OFFICER RESULTS 
The control variables for the officer models are 
Caucasian, single, Protestant, male, bachelor’s degree, 
field grade officer, and serving in the GCE. All officers, 
with the exception of warrant officers and LDOs, are 
expected to have at least a bachelor’s degree. WOs and LDOs 
are a very small percentage of the officer cadre—around 3%. 
For regular commissioned officers, the path to a commission 
is a long and difficult one relative to enlisting. Either 
the officers come from the enlisted ranks themselves, or 
they come from the civilian sector. An intense six-, 10-, 
or 12-week selection process prior to commissioning 
attrites physically weaker candidates, particularly because 
a first-class physical fitness test is required for 
graduation. Following that initial selection process is six 
months of classroom and field work, and then basic 
occupational training. This process demonstrates that the 
physical and mental benchmark for a basic Marine officer is 
significantly higher than for the basic Marine enlisted. 
Other differences between officer and enlisted include 
higher legal standards of conduct, higher levels of pay, 
and different work standards. Due in part to these factors, 
an overwhelming majority of officers separate due to 
contract completion (85.43%), be it resigning their 
commissions or retiring from the Service. 
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1. Linear Probability Models 
 
Table 10.   Officer Linear Probability Models 
As shown in Table 10, there are far fewer significant 
variables identifying the reasons that officers medically 
separate. In the base model shown in column (i), of those 
factors that are significant, such as years of service and 
age at separation, the magnitude is far smaller than in the 
enlisted models. They are, however, in the same direction. 
Key$Variables
Female &0.0023 (0.0063) 0.0039 (0.0115) 0.0043 (0.0085) &0.0022 (0.0063)
Post79/11 0.0110*** (0.0033) 0.0116*** (0.0033) 0.0113*** (0.0033) 0.0151*** (0.0042)
One7deployment &0.0113*** (0.0032) &0.0112*** (0.0032) &0.0100*** (0.0033) &0.0053 (0.0048)








Married 0.0015 (0.0045) 0.0015 (0.0045) 0.0015 (0.0045) 0.0014 (0.0045)
#7of7dependents &0.0003 (0.0009) &0.0003 (0.0009) &0.0004 (0.0009) &0.0003 (0.0009)
Religion
Catholic &0.0025 (0.0027) &0.0025 (0.0027) &0.0025 (0.0027) &0.0025 (0.0027)
Other/No7religion 0.0003 (0.0046) 0.0003 (0.0046) 0.0003 (0.0046) 0.0003 (0.0046)
Race
African&American &0.0020 (0.0054) &0.0019 (0.0054) &0.0021 (0.0054) &0.0020 (0.0054)
Hispanic &0.0056 (0.0064) &0.0056 (0.0064) &0.0055 (0.0064) &0.0055 (0.0064)
Asian7or7Native7American 0.0002 (0.0100) 0.0002 (0.0100) 0.0000 (0.0100) 0.0002 (0.0100)
Education
HS7or7some7college 0.0021 (0.0048) 0.0021 (0.0048) 0.0022 (0.0048) 0.0020 (0.0048)
Masters7or7Doctorate &0.0034 (0.0027) &0.0035 (0.0027) &0.0034 (0.0027) &0.0034 (0.0027)
Rank
Warrant7Officers 0.0178*** (0.0047) 0.0178*** (0.0047) 0.0176*** (0.0047) 0.0177*** (0.0047)
O1/O1E7to7O3/O3E 0.0268*** (0.0047) 0.0267*** (0.0047) 0.0268*** (0.0047) 0.0272*** (0.0047)
General7officers &0.0011 (0.0039) &0.0011 (0.0039) &0.0009 (0.0040) &0.0019 (0.0041)
Job$Category
Logistics7Combat7Element 0.0041 (0.0035) 0.0040 (0.0035) 0.0040 (0.0035) 0.0040 (0.0035)
Air7Combat7Element 0.0057 (0.0037) 0.0057 (0.0037) 0.0058 (0.0037) 0.0057 (0.0036)
Military$Demographics
GCT7score &0.0003*** (0.0001) &0.0003*** (0.0001) &0.0003*** (0.0001) &0.0003*** (0.0001)
Years7of7service &0.0045*** (0.0005) &0.0046*** (0.0005) &0.0045*** (0.0005) &0.0045*** (0.0005)
Age7at7separation 0.0026*** (0.0004) 0.0026*** (0.0004) 0.0026*** (0.0004) 0.0026*** (0.0004)
Constant 0.0376** (0.0186) 0.0372** (0.0186) 0.0373** (0.0186) 0.0370** (0.0186)
Observations 18,314 18,314 18,314 18,314
Adjusted7R&squared 0.0210 0.0210 0.0211 0.0212
Robust7standard7errors7in7parentheses
***7p<0.01,7**7p<0.05,7*7p<0.1
Medical7Separation Medical7Separation Medical7Separation Medical7Separation
(i) (j) (k) (l)
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The factors with the highest magnitude are tied to rank. 
Warrant officers have at least eight years of enlisted 
service, which is a reasonable explanation for their 
increased probability of medical separation. Company grade 
officers are generally the most physically active officers, 
as their job billets tend to be in smaller units that 
require a very high level of participation and interaction 
with the Marines. In the key variables, gender is not even 
statistically significant. I take the significant 
interaction coefficients and calculate their effect. These 
calculations are shown in Figures 13-15. 
 
Figure 13.  Gender * One Deployment Matrix—Officer (* Denotes 
Insignificant Effect) 
 !"#$"% = 0 (Male) !"#$"% = 1 (Female) !"#! "#$%&'"() = 0 0.0373 0.0373 + 0* = 
0.0373 !"#! "#$%&'"() = 1 0.0373 + -0.0100 = 
0.0273 
0.0373 + 0* +  





Figure 14.  Post-9/11 * One Deployment Matrix—Officer (* 
Denotes Insignificant Effect) 
 
Figure 15.  Post-9/11 * Two or More Deployments 
Matrix—Officer (* Denotes Insignificant Effect 
The large difference in significant variables between 
the enlisted and officer data is an interesting factor in 
itself, as almost all variables that lose significance for 
the officer models are personal characteristics rather than 
military ones. While the details are interesting, more 
intriguing is the vast overall difference in medical 
separation percentages between enlisted and officers. Some 
reasons have been discussed already, such as work 
requirements and higher physical fitness standards. There 
may be some qualitative reasons that cannot be measured 
 !"#$911 = 0 !"#$911 = 1 !"#! "#$%&'"() = 0 0.0370 0.0370 + 0.0151 = 
0.0521 !"#! "#$%&'"() = 1 0.0370 + 0* = 
0.0370 
0.0370 + 0.0151 + 
0* + -0.0117 = 
0.0404 
 
 !"#$911 = 0 !"#$911 = 1 !"#!!!! !"#! "#$%&'"()!= 0 0.0370 0.0370 + 0.0151 = 0.0521 




here, however. Officers do not generally physically train 
at the group level, and certainly not with the consistency 
of the enlisted Marines. Training as part of a group means 
that some enlisted Marines are underworked, and some are 
overworked and possibly pushed past their limits. If this 
occurs, it is far more likely that an officer will be 
granted time to rest without scrutiny. If you ask almost 
any enlisted Marine, those requesting time to rest, 
particularly for smaller injuries to heal before they 
develop into large injuries, are refuted or even looked 
down upon. I believe that finding a balance between pushing 
people past their mental barriers and pushing them past 
their physical limitations is an extremely important piece 
to this puzzle. 
2. Probit Estimation Models 
The officer probit estimation model mimics the 
significance, direction, and magnitude of the LPM, again 
indicating that the models are a relative fit. The model 
results are shown in Appendix D. 
D. LIMITATIONS 
The primary limitation to this study is that those 
still serving actively are not included. As, by definition, 
career Marines will serve for 10–30 years, conducting a 
survey with even a 20-year range cannot be all-inclusive. 
Veteran’s Assistance data is not available, so those 
separating with non-medical codes that qualify for 
disability benefits are not included. Also limiting is the 
bias of self-selection. This is the individual’s 
predilection for service, or the reason they choose to join 
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and/or stay in the Service. This can be affected by family 
history, education, positive or negative leadership 
experiences, personal bias, or anything that impacts a 
Marine’s opinion on service, particularly at the time of 
accession or reenlistment. 
Another limitation of this study is the lack of a 
combat-action variable, particularly for females. As women 
in the Marine Corps do not have a combat-specific MOS 
designator, there is no way to categorize them into a GCE. 
For this study, I was unable to identify those serving with 
Female Engagement Teams; I was also unable to identify 
recipients of a combat action ribbon or Purple Heart, male 
or female. This is mitigated by the fact that the overall 
purpose of the research question is to determine the 
general toll on the individual Marine, rather than the 
results of an acute set of actions. 
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V. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
There are three primary sections of data in this 
study, all based on a regression analysis of interaction 
terms. (see Tables 11 and 12). 
 
Table 11.   Probability of Medical Separation Among Separated 
Enlisted 
 
Table 12.   Probability of Medical Separation Among Separated 
Officers (* Denotes Insignificant Result) 
As evidenced from the summarized data, there is a 









Two or more 
Deployments 
Male 33.89% 29.49% 33.86% 32.87% 32.79% 
Female 43.96% 33.90% 41.82% 40.83% 32.01% 
Pre-
9/11 
  33.80% 30.72% 27.42% 
Post-
9/11 










Two or more 
Deployments 
Male 3.72%* 3.72%* 3.73% 2.73% 3.73%* 
Female 3.72%* 3.72%* 3.73%* 0.00% 3.73%* 
Pre-
9/11 
  3.7% 3.7%* 3.7%* 
Post-
9/11 
  5.21% 4.04% 3.51% 
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separations for enlisted females with two or more 
deployments. I also see an overall trend towards decreased 
medical separations as deployments increase, both before 
and after 9/11. However, the post-9/11 era has a lower 
overall percentage of medical separations. 
B. ADDITIONAL STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. All Active-Duty 
While the sample size in this thesis is universal in 
that it includes anyone with a separation code, a far more 
effective study would include everyone who is or has served 
on active-duty in the Marine Corps. By comparing those who 
separate with those who do not, one would truly see the 
effect of medical separations on the strength of the fleet 
over time. It would also be beneficial to include 
separations over the next five or 10 years, in order to 
include those currently battling with injuries as a result 
of the current conflicts. We will only get a complete 
picture of the outcome from Operations Iraqi Freedom and 
Enduring Freedom after those who deployed there have time 
to work through the lengthy medical boarding process as 
necessary.  
2. Shape of the Force 
The intriguing fact that medical separations have 
fallen with increased deployments may be better answered 
through an analysis of the makeup of the force. A common 
way to do this is to analyze predilection for service. For 
instance, a 2004 study by the Population Reference Bureau 
showed that certain states had a higher percentage of 
military recruits, indicating social factors for increased 
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enlistment (see Figure 16). Finding equivalent data for a 
pre-9/11 era would allow for a better understanding of that 
aspect of the desire to serve. 
In order to show the effect that socio-economic 
factors (such as local unemployment rate and local median 
income) have on willingness to serve, all Marines, both 
active and separated, need to be observed. Without knowing 
the shape of the current active force or the active force 
at any point in time, this sort of socio-economic 
information is irrelevant. However, with expanded 
information, it could be a valuable analysis tool. 
 
  
Figure 16.  Recruits as Percent of Youth Population (From 
Segal & Segal, 2004) 
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3. Increased Data Input 
Obviously, any observational study would be improved 
with more complete data. In studying the trend in medical 
separation, additional information on combat time and 
combat missions would be valuable, such as participation in 
Female Engagement Teams. Given the high magnitude of 
correlation between increased deployments and reduced 
medical separation for women, applying the same level of 
analysis to only those women with combat operation time 
will be the best way to add to the larger sociological 
debate over women in combat.  
Other useful information would be physical fitness 
test and combat fitness test scores over time, as well as 
limited duty status information. Many high-performing 
Marines at any stage in their careers will be “carried,” 
even with a limited duty status. This will allow them to 
stay through completion of a contract and separate with an 
End-of-Active-Service discharge rather than a medical or 
unsatisfactory performance discharge. Veteran’s Affairs 
disability ratings would also be a highly effective tool 
for this study. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The primary research question for this thesis is “What 
is the cause of medical separations for Marines who 
otherwise show intent to remain in the Service?” While the 
data does not point to a single, conclusive indicator, what 
it shows as not being a factor is just as important. 
Intuitively, increased deployments would be a culprit for 
increased medical problems. However, my analysis of the 
data indicates that either the initial presumptions are 
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flat-out wrong, or there is a great deal of unseen bias 
that counteracts the effects, such as patriotic motivation 
or job satisfaction. Overall, the largest factor in medical 
separations seems to be tied to the senior enlisted ranks. 
It’s an anecdotal truth among Marines that a year in the 
Marine Corps equals at least three years as a civilian, and 
the data seems to corroborate that. 
A secondary research question concerns whether or not 
the impact of increased deployment tempo is uniform across 
gender. The answer to this question seems to be “no,” but 
not for the expected reasons. Women who deploy at all have 
a reduced tendency for medical separation, implying that 
many who are destined for medical separations are largely 
non-deployable to begin with, due to personal choice or 
physical circumstance. The resulting sociological 
implications of this are not for this study to determine, 
but given the correlation between female training standards 
and decreased medical separations, there is room to develop 
additional quantitative and policy analyses. Also tied to 
this is the sheer magnitude of the drop in medical 
separations between men and women. While both end up around 
the same place, the difference in separation probability 
for men and women with no deployments is almost eight 
percentage points. Men go from approximately 34% of Marines 
with no deployments having a probability of medical 
separation down to 33% after two or more deployments, but 
women drop from 42% to 32%. These results have the highest 
level of statistical significance, and are extremely 
important to the gender question. This is a very high 
indication that there are women strongly capable of intense 
service. 
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Initially, the differential gender trend in medical 
separation between pre- and post-911 periods is significant 
because of the rapidly changing role of women in the Marine 
Corps. It wasn’t until 1997 that women received equivalent 
Marine Combat Training after recruit training (“History of 
the Women Marines,” n.d.), and in the mid-1990s, the 
women’s required run increased from one-and-a-half miles to 
three miles, and the women’s crunches requirement also 
became equivalent to that of men. This disparity in 
training and employment may account for a higher rate of 
medical separations in the pre-9/11 era due to lower 
physical training standards and related expectations.  
Rank has a surprising effect concerning medical 
separations. Several theories for this are proposed in the 
previous section, but ultimately we cannot deny that 
officers medically separate at a far lower percentage than 
enlisted. In fact, according to the data used in this 
study, over half of officers stay until voluntary 
retirement, while less than 3% of enlisted retire 
voluntarily.6  
As deployments increase in both the pre- and post-9/11 
era, the incidences of medical separations decrease. This 
not only suggests an increased level of personal and 
professional fulfillment, but also presents a strong 
correlation between personal morale and physical health. In 
a 1997 study titled Intrinsic Motivation and Exercise 
Adherence, the authors showed that adherence to exercise 
programs was associated with enjoyment, competence, and 
                     
6 Voluntary retirement does not include medical retirements in this 
calculation. 
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social interaction (Ryan, 1997, p. 335). Extrinsic 
motivations such as physical appearance have some 
importance in getting someone to start working out, but 
sticking with it requires satisfaction of the intrinsic 
motivators just listed. As Marines deploy and engage in 
work that increases their motivation and job satisfaction, 
their intrinsic motivations to exercise increase as well. 
If Marines are less satisfied with their work, they will 
gain little enjoyment from required physical training and 
have a reduced desire to be physically competent. This will 
increase risk of injury, and the data shows evidence of 
this trend, as medical separations are inversely correlated 
to number of deployments.  
With the available data and the models we have chosen, 
the overall decline of medical separations for Marines who 
otherwise show intent to remain in the Service might be 
tied to job satisfaction. Factors that cause job 
satisfaction, called motivators, include challenging work, 
achievement, recognition, responsibility, and the nature of 
the work itself (Redmond, 2011). Those who chose to join 
the Marines expect a certain type of work environment. It’s 
no secret that the motto of the Marine Corps is “Every 
Marine a rifleman,” and people expect to be challenged 
physically and mentally. While this can be done in a 
peacetime or garrison environment, everything is just 
training until an actual conflict happens. Putting training 
to action and conducting real-world missions is a 
culminating event for Marines.  
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APPENDIX A – OCCUPATIONAL FIELDS 
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APPENDIX B – SEPARATION CODES 
Appendix B lists all separation code descriptions used 
in this report. The top 20 overall codes are listed with 
percentages and observations. All codes are then listed 
with percentage of the total number of separations in the 
data. There are additional codes not present as there are 
no corresponding observations. It is also important to note 
that separation codes themselves are protected for privacy 
reasons, so these code descriptions are not available for 
comparison. 
 












































































































































Table 17.   Medical Separation Codes 
 































































































































































































































































































Table 20.   Training Failure Codes 
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APPENDIX C – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY RANK 
Appendix C provides descriptive statistics broken down 
into five enlisted rank categories and four officer rank 
categories. This gives an interesting perspective of the 
shape of the force and the relationships between ranks. The 
Senior SNCO and all GO ranks are not unilaterally 
represented in the GCE, LCE, or ACE categories as these are 
divided only by MOS, and no specific unit data is 
available. Generals, first sergeants, and sergeants major 
have an MOS that is unique to the rank, but applicable in 
any type of Marine Corps unit. Concerning education, CGOs 
and FGOs with less than a bachelor’s degree are LDOs, 
promoted from the warrant officer ranks where no such 




Table 23.   Descriptive Statistics by Rank 
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APPENDIX D – SEPARATION MODELS 
 
Table 24.   Enlisted Separations Linear Probability Model 
coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se
Key$Variables
Female 0.0686*** (0.0069) 20.0851*** (0.0074) 0.0240*** (0.0042) 20.0388*** (0.0038) 0.0313*** (0.0043)
Post;9/11 20.0482*** (0.0036) 0.0772*** (0.0040) 20.0120*** (0.0021) 0.0063*** (0.0024) 20.0233*** (0.0019)
One;deployment 20.0107*** (0.0041) 0.0245*** (0.0047) 20.0139*** (0.0022) 0.0014 (0.0026) 20.0014 (0.0024)
Two;or;more;deployments 20.0142*** (0.0040) 0.0453*** (0.0047) 20.0241*** (0.0021) 20.0114*** (0.0026) 0.0043* (0.0022)
Family$Status
Married 20.0016 (0.0043) 0.0219*** (0.0048) 0.0006 (0.0024) 20.0120*** (0.0029) 20.0089*** (0.0025)
#;of;dependents 0.0043*** (0.0014) 20.0079*** (0.0017) 0.0003 (0.0008) 0.0021** (0.0009) 0.0011 (0.0008)
Religion
Catholic 20.0123*** (0.0039) 0.0126*** (0.0044) 20.0078*** (0.0021) 0.0056** (0.0025) 0.0019 (0.0023)
Other/No;religion 20.0154*** (0.0040) 0.0167*** (0.0045) 0.0019 (0.0023) 20.0024 (0.0027) 20.0007 (0.0023)
Race
African2American 20.0296*** (0.0042) 0.0240*** (0.0049) 20.0076*** (0.0024) 0.0250*** (0.0030) 20.0118*** (0.0024)
Hispanic 20.0562*** (0.0051) 0.0546*** (0.0060) 0.0034 (0.0030) 0.0078** (0.0036) 20.0097*** (0.0029)
Asian;or;Native;American 20.0409*** (0.0089) 0.0412*** (0.0104) 20.0077 (0.0047) 0.0119* (0.0062) 20.0044 (0.0052)
Education
Some;college 0.0048 (0.0073) 20.0067 (0.0083) 0.0076** (0.0039) 20.0056 (0.0045) 20.0002 (0.0042)
Bachelors;or;Higher 20.0439*** (0.0092) 20.0045 (0.0116) 0.0357*** (0.0064) 20.0175*** (0.0057) 0.0302*** (0.0071)
ENLISTED()(LPM
Medical Contract;Completion Unsat;Performance Legal Other
Rank
E1/E2/E3 20.1101*** (0.0045) 20.4522*** (0.0045) 0.0491*** (0.0033) 0.5383*** (0.0051) 20.0250*** (0.0023)
E6/E7 0.0547*** (0.0039) 20.0485*** (0.0049) 20.0109*** (0.0018) 20.0073*** (0.0020) 0.0121*** (0.0024)
E8/E9;1stSgt/SgtMaj;(admin;specialists) 0.2850*** (0.0155) 20.2068*** (0.0179) 0.0099** (0.0049) 20.0639*** (0.0084) 20.0242** (0.0095)
E8/E9;MSgt/MGySgt;(tech;specialists) 0.3535*** (0.0143) 20.2853*** (0.0160) 0.0095** (0.0047) 20.0492*** (0.0080) 20.0285*** (0.0079)
Job$category
Logistics;Combat;Element 20.0498*** (0.0038) 0.0304*** (0.0042) 0.0125*** (0.0020) 0.0123*** (0.0025) 20.0054*** (0.0021)
Air;Combat;Element 20.0667*** (0.0045) 0.0564*** (0.0050) 0.0055** (0.0024) 0.0108*** (0.0029) 20.0060** (0.0026)
Military$Demographics
GCT;score 20.0004*** (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0002** (0.0001) 20.0002*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001)
Years;of;service 20.0305*** (0.0007) 0.0329*** (0.0009) 20.0029*** (0.0004) 0.0006 (0.0005) 20.0002 (0.0005)
Age;at;separation 0.0094*** (0.0006) 20.0099*** (0.0007) 20.0004 (0.0003) 0.0009* (0.0005) 0.0000 (0.0004)
Constant 0.3377*** (0.0218) 0.5129*** (0.0245) 0.0710*** (0.0115) 0.0304** (0.0146) 0.0480*** (0.0129)
Observations 67,550 67,550 67,550 67,550 67,550
























coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se
0.0712*** (0.0071) @0.0961*** (0.0084) 0.0203*** (0.0036) @0.0350*** (0.0031) 0.0311*** (0.0043)
@0.0510*** (0.0037) 0.0987*** (0.0048) @0.0095*** (0.0017) 0.0001 (0.0024) @0.0241*** (0.0021)
@0.0084** (0.0041) 0.0290*** (0.0054) @0.0098*** (0.0018) 0.0009 (0.0028) @0.0011 (0.0022)
@0.0140*** (0.0043) 0.0550*** (0.0056) @0.0221*** (0.0018) @0.0118*** (0.0027) 0.0050** (0.0026)
@0.0020 (0.0043) 0.0296*** (0.0057) 0.0010 (0.0021) @0.0138*** (0.0030) @0.0095*** (0.0024)
0.0050*** (0.0015) @0.0096*** (0.0019) 0.0010 (0.0007) 0.0024** (0.0010) 0.0012 (0.0008)
@0.0125*** (0.0039) 0.0146*** (0.0052) @0.0068*** (0.0018) 0.0055** (0.0027) 0.0019 (0.0022)
@0.0149*** (0.0039) 0.0200*** (0.0054) 0.0016 (0.0019) @0.0013 (0.0026) @0.0006 (0.0022)
@0.0293*** (0.0042) 0.0307*** (0.0058) @0.0055*** (0.0020) 0.0240*** (0.0032) @0.0118*** (0.0022)
@0.0556*** (0.0049) 0.0650*** (0.0072) 0.0034 (0.0029) 0.0071* (0.0039) @0.0093*** (0.0028)
@0.0379*** (0.0086) 0.0482*** (0.0123) @0.0063 (0.0043) 0.0125* (0.0069) @0.0041 (0.0049)
0.0017 (0.0073) @0.0069 (0.0096) 0.0065 (0.0040) @0.0013 (0.0051) 0.0003 (0.0040)
@0.0506*** (0.0093) @0.0029 (0.0138) 0.0408*** (0.0079) @0.0153** (0.0067) 0.0303*** (0.0071)







@0.1001*** (0.0036) @0.4933*** (0.0045) 0.0349*** (0.0029) 0.5303*** (0.0060) @0.0263*** (0.0021)
0.0699*** (0.0048) @0.0641*** (0.0056) @0.0112*** (0.0021) @0.0068** (0.0031) 0.0126*** (0.0025)
0.3233*** (0.0316) @0.1583*** (0.0276) @0.0535*** (0.0059) @0.0214*** (0.0077)










@0.0493*** (0.0037) 0.0349*** (0.0049) 0.0108*** (0.0019) 0.0112*** (0.0025) @0.0056*** (0.0021)
@0.0621*** (0.0040) 0.0643*** (0.0059) 0.0054** (0.0024) 0.0081** (0.0032) @0.0060*** (0.0023)
@0.0004*** (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0002** (0.0001) @0.0004*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001)
@0.0321*** (0.0008) 0.0384*** (0.0010) @0.0030*** (0.0004) 0.0006 (0.0005) @0.0006 (0.0004)
0.0101*** (0.0006) @0.0122*** (0.0009) @0.0003 (0.0003) 0.0001 (0.0004) 0.0001 (0.0003)





0.0480 0.149 0.0534 0.340 0.0198
0.208 0.567 0.0519 0.119 0.0550
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coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se
@0.0023 (0.0063) 0.0241** (0.0114) @0.0307*** (0.0066) 0.0218*** (0.0084) @0.0129*** (0.0044)
0.0110*** (0.0033) 0.0448*** (0.0061) @0.0286*** (0.0041) @0.0258*** (0.0038) @0.0014 (0.0027)
@0.0113*** (0.0032) 0.0066 (0.0066) 0.0196*** (0.0047) @0.0158*** (0.0037) 0.0008 (0.0028)
@0.0170*** (0.0031) 0.0326*** (0.0057) 0.0218*** (0.0041) @0.0284*** (0.0029) @0.0091*** (0.0024)
0.0015 (0.0045) 0.0446*** (0.0087) @0.0168*** (0.0060) @0.0175*** (0.0053) @0.0118*** (0.0039)
@0.0003 (0.0009) @0.0015 (0.0018) @0.0005 (0.0013) 0.0013 (0.0010) 0.0010 (0.0008)
@0.0025 (0.0027) 0.0113** (0.0052) @0.0062* (0.0036) @0.0007 (0.0030) @0.0019 (0.0021)
0.0003 (0.0046) @0.0072 (0.0089) 0.0019 (0.0063) 0.0020 (0.0052) 0.0031 (0.0040)
@0.0020 (0.0054) @0.0636*** (0.0106) 0.0315*** (0.0075) 0.0306*** (0.0074) 0.0035 (0.0047)
@0.0056 (0.0064) @0.0506*** (0.0139) 0.0309*** (0.0102) 0.0166* (0.0086) 0.0087 (0.0065)
0.0002 (0.0100) @0.0255 (0.0198) 0.0034 (0.0136) 0.0184 (0.0127) 0.0035 (0.0091)






0.0021 (0.0048) @0.0139* (0.0082) @0.0197*** (0.0045) 0.0082* (0.0049) 0.0233*** (0.0051)














0.0178*** (0.0047) 0.0325*** (0.0076) @0.0387*** (0.0040) @0.0038 (0.0042) @0.0077** (0.0038)
0.0268*** (0.0047) @0.0952*** (0.0098) @0.0032 (0.0074) 0.0412*** (0.0050) 0.0304*** (0.0039)
@0.0011 (0.0039) @0.1095*** (0.0118) 0.0316*** (0.0042) 0.0564*** (0.0100) 0.0225*** (0.0027)
0.0041 (0.0035) @0.0322*** (0.0066) 0.0135*** (0.0042) 0.0117*** (0.0039) 0.0029 (0.0028)
0.0057 (0.0037) @0.0815*** (0.0072) 0.0602*** (0.0053) 0.0076* (0.0039) 0.0080*** (0.0030)
@0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0022*** (0.0002) @0.0001 (0.0001) @0.0013*** (0.0001) @0.0005*** (0.0001)
@0.0045*** (0.0005) 0.0033*** (0.0010) 0.0031*** (0.0007) @0.0018*** (0.0006) @0.0001 (0.0005)
0.0026*** (0.0004) 0.0087*** (0.0008) @0.0071*** (0.0006) @0.0025*** (0.0005) @0.0017*** (0.0004)
0.0376** (0.0186) 0.1699*** (0.0385) 0.3087*** (0.0261) 0.3458*** (0.0250) 0.1380*** (0.0161)
18,314 18,314 18,314 18,314 18,314






















coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se
@0.0014 (0.0038) 0.0169** (0.0077) @0.0144*** (0.0029) 0.0058* (0.0031) @0.0039*** (0.0011)
0.0076*** (0.0023) 0.0396*** (0.0056) @0.0188*** (0.0031) @0.0113*** (0.0021) 0.0001 (0.0011)
@0.0083*** (0.0025) @0.0053 (0.0062) 0.0179*** (0.0039) @0.0027 (0.0018) 0.0019 (0.0015)
@0.0126*** (0.0023) 0.0166*** (0.0055) 0.0205*** (0.0036) @0.0113*** (0.0017) @0.0025** (0.0011)
0.0007 (0.0030) 0.0343*** (0.0074) @0.0105*** (0.0037) @0.0076*** (0.0026) @0.0051*** (0.0019)
@0.0000 (0.0009) @0.0047** (0.0019) 0.0017* (0.0009) 0.0015** (0.0006) 0.0011*** (0.0004)
@0.0019 (0.0023) 0.0099** (0.0047) @0.0039* (0.0022) @0.0007 (0.0016) @0.0008 (0.0010)
0.0002 (0.0035) @0.0050 (0.0074) 0.0002 (0.0034) 0.0011 (0.0024) 0.0015 (0.0016)
@0.0014 (0.0039) @0.0616*** (0.0112) 0.0279*** (0.0067) 0.0132*** (0.0040) 0.0016 (0.0020)
@0.0042 (0.0046) @0.0432*** (0.0129) 0.0213*** (0.0073) 0.0067 (0.0042) 0.0031 (0.0027)
0.0000 (0.0074) @0.0220 (0.0171) 0.0036 (0.0078) 0.0075 (0.0064) 0.0010 (0.0033)





0.0020 (0.0043) @0.0192* (0.0103) @0.0093** (0.0045) 0.0048 (0.0036) 0.0163*** (0.0043)













0.0248*** (0.0070) 0.0244*** (0.0089) @0.0328*** (0.0025) 0.0057 (0.0042) 0.0002 (0.0023)
0.0194*** (0.0046) @0.0374*** (0.0074) @0.0066** (0.0027) 0.0106*** (0.0030) 0.0123*** (0.0028)
@0.0577 (0.0704) 0.1055* (0.0612)
0.0027 (0.0028) @0.0267*** (0.0060) 0.0066** (0.0030) 0.0056*** (0.0019) 0.0012 (0.0012)
0.0037 (0.0032) @0.0784*** (0.0076) 0.0416*** (0.0046) 0.0041* (0.0023) 0.0047*** (0.0016)
@0.0002** (0.0001) 0.0017*** (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0001) @0.0007*** (0.0001) @0.0002*** (0.0000)
@0.0040*** (0.0004) 0.0042*** (0.0008) 0.0010*** (0.0004) @0.0016*** (0.0003) @0.0001 (0.0002)
0.0024*** (0.0003) 0.0088*** (0.0006) @0.0046*** (0.0003) @0.0013*** (0.0002) @0.0011*** (0.0001)





0.0767 0.192 0.161 0.225 0.177
0.0306 0.854 0.0578 0.0392 0.0190
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